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Abstract: Youth unemployment is neither the only nor the basic problem of the European 
labour market. The comparative analysis of unemployment data demonstrates that the 
unemployment of older people is even more serious. The article proves that the weight of 
young people in total unemployment has as a tendency been declining in the “inner 
periphery” of the EU, among them in Central and Eastern European member states (CEECs). 
The trend is just the opposite in the developed or “core” countries of the Union where 
youngsters took a higher share in total unemployment in 2012 than 10-12 years ago. In 
Europe there are millions of young people beyond the active unemployed who do not want to 
work or think they cannot find a job that fulfils their expectations and refuse to take part in 
any kind of education or training (NEETs-“Not in Employment, Education or Training”). By 
estimating the rate of NEETs in the adult population the article claims that the NEETs-
phenomenon is not the differentia specifica of the youth. At the end the article details two 
suggestions for the mitigation of the problem. It concludes that the joblessness in Europe is an 
old and tendencially worsening problem that cannot be solved by particular policies.  
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Youth unemployment is seen nowadays as one of the most severe problems in Europe. The 
leaders of the Union devoted a whole a summit to the issue in July 2013. The problem seems 
fierce not only because jobless youth is expensive for the society – EUR 153 billion or 1.2% 
of the GDP in the EU in 2011 (Eurofound 2012, p.2). – but also because it affects the future 
of it. If an increasing part of the new generations begins its adult life with the feeling of being 
unnecessary and having no chance to integrate into the mainstream society, the future will be 
burdened with more and more inexperienced and disappointed people with all its 
consequences.Therefore the mitigation of youth unemployment is of utmost importance. To 
be successful, however, we have to understand the magnitude and the roots of the situation.  
 
1 Review of the literature 
 
The unemployment of young people (less than 25 years of age) is not new. It first got into the 
focus of labour market research and government policies in the crisis of the 1970s (Clark and 
Summers 1978; OECD 1980; Lynch and Richardson 1982). The present crisis put the 
problem of the most vulnerable groups, among them the youth of the labour market, in focus 
in Europe and globally as well (Choudhry et al 2011; Scarpetta at al 2010; Verick 2009 and 
2010; Dietrich 2012). Looking at the present and remembering the 1970s and 1980s when the 
youth joblessness crisis was similar, Bell and Blanchflower (2010) states that it feels like déjà 
vu. 
Although the youth unemployment has an extended literature, the problem gains special 
attention in periods of recessions. The first analysis during the crisis of the 1970s concluded 
that youth employment and unemployment has a pronounced cyclical character (Clark and 
Summers 1978, O'Higgins, 1997), others found that the youth unemployment problem goes 
beyond cyclical changes and other factors such as wages, education and experience play a role 
in the longer term trends (Freeman and Wise 1980; Rice 1986; Ghellab 1998; Korenman and 
Neumark 2000; Carmeci and Mauro 2003; Caroleo and Pastore 2007). This shift of attention 
to institutions or “labour market rigidities” gained strength in the 1990s (Blanchard 2006). In 
this aspect the inefficiency of the partial labour market reforms have been revealed as well 
(e.g. Blanchard and Landier 2001)  
Some of the papers have taken a more general view when digging for the reasons of youth 
unemployment. Decades ago Clark and Summers nailed down “that the lack of desirable 
employment opportunities is the crux of the problem for those most seriously affected by 
youth unemployment.” (Clark and Summers 1978, p.2). Similarly, O‟Higgins (2001) 
emphasized that youth unemployment is a reflection of a country's poor macroeconomic 
performance and that the argument, according to which the major cause of youth 
unemployment is the absence of the right skills and attitudes of the young generation is only 
partly true as the real reason is that the society failed to create enough jobs for them. Still he 
does not go beyond the institutional frames and suggests moving towards a more demand 
oriented strategy based on social partnership by including workers‟ and employers‟ 
organizations in tackling the problem. Manpower Group (2012) suggests promoting economic 
growth, entrepreneurship development and education among others.  
Although the results of  research presented a rich palette of  reasons and implications of youth 
unemployment, education and training gained predominance as the first cause and hence the 
best remedy of the joblessness of the youth. It is especially true for the policy and 
recommendations of the European Commission.  
3 
 
The phenomenon what we call now NEETs (unemployed persons who are not in education or 
training) appeared also decades ago, albeit indirectly, by the demotivation of the young people 
for doing formal wage jobs and integrating into the society (Clark and Summers 1978). 
O‟Higgins (2001) draws the attention to the fact that high levels of youth unemployment are 
likely to lead to alienation and social unrest. 
Korenman and Neumark (2000 p.97) realizes the strong connection between adult and youth 
unemployment. They claim that „youth unemployment rates are much more responsive to 
general labour market improvements than to declines in cohort size” and a return to low adult 
unemployment rates can improve youth labour markets.  
Although the predominant opinion is that youth unemployment tends to grow faster than adult 
unemployment, not all researches confirm this result. This is due to differences in methods 
used. Several studies build on the analysis of the variations in unemployment rates measured 
in percentage points. O‟Higgins (2001) explains why this is not adequate to describe the 
relative importance of youth unemployment. Although the variations in youth unemployment 
rates are much larger than variations in adult unemployment rates, the two variations are 
proportional to one another as the youth unemployment rate is always higher than the adult 
unemployment rate. He states that the youth unemployment rate and adult unemployment 
rates are proportional on the long run. In this article we follow O‟Higgins‟ line and analyse 
proportional changes instead of the changes measured in percentage points.  
In spite of extensive research results , youth unemployment is still seen mostly as a particular 
problem. In this article I intend to reinforce those arguments that are seemingly ignored partly 
by the mainstream literature and definitely by the European socio-economic policies 
concerning the consequence character of the youth unemployment and suggest that its 
mitigation is not possible without offering a solution to the general problem of the historically 
increasing unemployment the reason of which lies in the laws of competition for profit. 
 
2 The framework of the study 
 
This study aims at contributing to the better identification of the problem of youth 
unemployment through extending the scope of the analysis.  
In my opinion, youth unemployment is not the most acute problem of the European labour 
market. I intend to prove it step by step beginning with the analysis of unemployment data 
that demonstrates that the unemployment of older people is even more serious. I also detect 
that in the last decade the relative importance of youth unemployment increased more in 
developed countries of the EU than in the CEEC or in the euro-crisis countries. We continue 
by broadening the scope of the investigation with NEETs. I will point out that even this 
phenomena is not the differentia specifica of the youth: it characterizes older generations too.  
I use a “three dimensional” method of the analysis. As a first aspect, I examine the given 
problem (active youth unemployment as a take-off point) in a moment that means here a short 
term period since the crises. Then I compare the given problem with other aspects (the 
unemployment of older generations and NEETs). As a third, but simultaneously applied 
momentum I study the tendencies of examined variables by using long term data when 
available. 
The article builds up as follows. In Chapter 3 I identify the youth unemployment and NEETs 
problem. In Chapter 4 I place youth unemployment in the context of general unemployment. 
Here first I intend to demonstrate the inferiority of the youth unemployment relative to the 
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problem of unemployment in general (Section 4.1 and 4.2). As a next step I go on with the 
analysis of the young and adult NEETs (Section 4.3 and 4.4). In Chapter 5 I present two 
initiatives offered by different segments of the European society, namely by the Commission 
(Youth Guarantee Scheme) and the civil society (Unconditional Basic Income).  
 
3 Youth unemployment in the EU at a first glance 
 
Youth unemployment has several direct reasons but in contemporary Europe the most 
frequently mentioned one is the unpreparedness of young people to enter the labour market. 
The reason is that Europe is in a period of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” that leads to a 
new economic system with new structures based on new technologies. However, Europe is 
not there yet. The structure and level of education are lagging behind instead of leading the 
technological change. From this point of view the unpreparedness of youth means insufficient 
knowledge of the youth. The inadequate education they receive means there is a structural 
mismatch between their skills and the demand of the market. Besides these two factors, but 
strongly related to them and the NEET-phenomenon, disappointment explains the joblessness 
of young, even well educated people to a great extent. Disappointment is the by product of 
every crisis, but also the sign of fundamental problems of a given society, what, very 
naturally, the young people feel at first.  
In the EU27 the unemployment rate of those less than 25 years of age increased from 15.7% 
in 2007 to 22.7% in 2012 and reached more than 23% in the first half of 2013. This rate is 
more than twice as high as the rate of adult unemployment that was less than 9.7% in May 
2013.
2
  
Less than 30% of unemployed aged 15-24 found a job and 42% of employment contracts of 
young people were temporary that is four times higher than in the case of adults. Almost 
every third young person is working part time, ca. twice the rate of the adults in 2011 (EC 
2012a, p.4; Eurofound 2012, pp.14-16). Although the rate of long-term unemployment
3
 – if 
measured as a percentage of the total number of  unemployed in the given age-cohort – is 
lower for those of 15-24 of age than for those between 25-74 (31.9% and 48.5% respectively 
in 2012Q3) it is much higher if the denominator is the number of the total population in the 
given age-cohort: 7.3% of the young population and 4.3% of the adults were unemployed for 
12 months or more in 2012 (EC 2012a, p.4).  
But it is not unemployment itself that makes the problem of youth so severe. The term 
unemployment conventionally covers only people who are not in education, want to work and 
actively seek a job but cannot find one. Those are the so-called active unemployed (ILO 
definition). There is however a large group within the young generation that does not belong 
to the active unemployed, but is neither in employment nor in education. They, together with 
the active unemployed (who are not in training) form the group of young people who are 
called NEETs. The identification of this group originates from the United Kingdom in the 
1980s and the expression NEET was formally introduced first in 1999 (Eurofound 2012, 
p.20).  
The Europe 2020 flagship initiative Youth on the Move mentioned the problem as a group of 
“young people at risk” beyond the active unemployed (EC 2010, p.16). In 2011 in the Union 
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there were around 14 million young people of 15-29 years of age out of both education and 
work from which 8.7 million were active unemployed.  
There is a difference between the concept of unemployment rate and the rate of NEETs. The 
denominator for unemployment rate is the active population (those who are neither employed 
nor in education but look for a job actively) while for the rate of NEETs the denominator is 
the population of the age group. So, whereas the number of NEETs is higher than that of the 
active unemployed, the rate of the former is lower than that of the latter.
4
  
 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑕 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑠 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑇 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 
So whereas youth unemployment rate was almost 23 percent, the rate of NEETs stood at 13.2 
percent for 15-24 years old and 20.6% for 25-29 years old in the EU in 2012.
5
  
 
4 From youth unemployment to the problem of labour market in general  
 
In order to better understand the problem of youth unemployment and to evaluate the youth 
employment policy of the EU more properly, we have to analyze the situation from several 
aspects. First,I investigate youth unemployment rate in the sense of ILO-definition on the long 
run. Second, I analyze the change of the absolute magnitude of youth and total unemployment 
and the relation between these two after the outbreak of the crisis (share of young unemployed 
– SYU). I compare the SYU to the changes of the relative sizes of youth cohort in the total 
(15-74 years old) population. 
After analyzing these data (Section 4.1.-4.2.) I will dig into the problem of the NEETs (4.3.). 
In Section 4.4. I flesh the fundamental roots of youth unemployment and NEETs that go far 
beyond the age-cohort differences of the labour market. 
 
4.1 The youth unemployment rate 
In Chapter 3 I present data for the sharp increase of youth and general unemployment after 
2007. But if we look back in time we find a different trend. In the middle of the 1990s, youth 
unemployment rate in the EU15 and the Euro17
6
 was not much lower than today: 20-21% in 
1995-1996 against 22-23% in 2012. Between 1996 and 2001, the rate fell to 14-15%. For the 
EU27 data are available only from 2000 on. Since 2000, the trends are similar in these three 
country-groups: between 2001 and 2004-2005, youth unemployment rate increased by 2-3 
percentage points then fell again until 2007. After that it skyrocketed, and in 2009 reached the 
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trend-line that began in 2000 and the rates of the three country groups became similar, 
moving around the 22-23% level. (Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1 Youth unemployment rates in the EU15, Euro17* and EU27 1993-2012, 
percent 
 
*: 17 members of Eurozone. 
Source: Eurostat  
 
The averages of these groups, however, hide important inner differences. For example in 
Spain, youth employment has always been the most fragile segment of the labour market. The 
rate of unemployment for people less than 25 years of age was above 40% at the time of the 
Spanish accession to the EU (in 1986) and after a period of decrease this rate jumped over 
40% again in 1993-1994. Youth unemployment rate in Spain has been the highest in the 
EU15 until 1998. Since then, for a decade until the explosion of the crisis, Greece and Italy, 
then also some Eastern European new members have taken over the lead from Spain.  
In the CEECs, trends are partly similar. Today the Baltic States, Hungary, Slovenia and 
Croatia have higher rates of youth unemployment than ever in the past one and a half decade. 
But Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia have already produced rates in the first years of 
the 2000s that were close to or even higher than those in any quarters since the beginning of 
the present crisis.  
To sum it up, today youth unemployment rates in most of the EU27 increased after 2008, but 
the phenomenon and even the level of youth unemployment rates are not new at all. 
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4.2 The share of youth unemployment in total and comparatively to youth population 
share 
In the first quarter of 2008 in the EU27 youth (less than 25 years old) unemployment hit the 
lowest point in the preceding ten years by slightly over 4 million persons. Since then it has 
increased by 39.6% or by more than 1.6 million until the first quarter of 2013. However, the 
present level (5.6 million in 2013Q1) is higher only by 5-800 thousand or ca. 12% than it was 
in the first half of the 2000s.  
On the other hand, the number of unemployed aged more than 25 years has increased much 
more dynamically than that of the young unemployed and far outstripped not only the best 
years before the crisis, but also the worst quarter of the 2000s (16.1 million in 2004Q4). 
Between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1, as a result of the crisis the number of 25-74 years old 
unemployed swelled by 72% or by 8.7 million.  
These data hide differences between the countries. In 2012 in Spain, where youth 
unemployment rates are among the highest in the EU, there were half a million more young 
unemployed than before the crisis, but the number for 2012 (945,000) is lower than in 1996 
(973,000) or in 1983-88 and 1993-95 when there were more than 1 million young 
unemployed in the country. As a result of the crisis the number of unemployment of those 
aged 25-74 years grew much faster (223% between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1) than that of aged 
less than 25 years (93% in the same period). 
This is true also for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, where youth unemployment was not 
higher at the end of 2012 than it was at the end of the 1990s or in some years of the 1980s. 
After 2007, in all of the above mentioned five countries the level of unemployment in general 
and in the 25-74 age cohort increased faster than the number of young (less than 25) 
unemployed. Similarly, after 2007, in the CEECs the total number of young unemployed has 
grown slower or at about the same pace as the total number of unemployment. On the other 
hand, the number of young unemployed increased faster than that of the adult unemployed in 
the majority of most developed countries of the EU. 
In spite of these the prevalent opinion is that youth unemployment is more sensitive to crisis 
than the total unemployment or – what is only another relation – adult unemployment. (OECD 
2008, ILO 2010, Choudhry et al 2011, Bell and Blanchflower 2011). This result stems from 
the regression analysis of the unemployment rates of different age cohorts on the basis of the 
percentage point changes. This method is, however, problematic. On the one hand, the 
denominator of the unemployment rate tends to be much less relative to the size of population 
of the age cohort in the case of youth than in the case of adults because there are 
proportionally more young people in education than adults.
7
 On the other hand, the use of 
percentage point changes of the unemployment rates in analysis, as also O‟Higgins (2001 and 
2010) remarks, paints a more dramatic albeit less accurate picture of the relative change in 
youth unemployment, since youth unemployment rate is always higher than the adult rate.  
For this reason, I think the share of young people in total unemployment is a useful additional 
indicator for understanding the relative importance of youth unemployment in the crises and 
on the long run. First of all we have to emphasize that the rate of youth unemployment and the 
share of young people within total unemployment are two different ratios. The former equals 
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adult unemployment rate. Thus the meaning of the two unemployment indicators is different again. 
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with the number of unemployed per active population (employed plus active unemployed) in 
the given age cohort, whereas the latter is:  
 
𝑆𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 (𝑆𝑌𝑈) =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
 
 
Looking at the change in SYU in Europe the first result that has to be mentioned is that the 
SYU has decreased in almost all member states of the EU in the present crisis, i.e. between 
2008 and 2012. That means that the relative importance of youth unemployment lessened. 
The longer term tendencies are also important and paint different pictures of the country 
groups. 
The SYU was 24.3-25.2% in the EU27 between 2000 and 2008. Since 2008 SYU has been 
continuously decreasing and stood at 21.2% in April 2013, the lowest level ever since 2000 
(the first year when data are available). This is especially true for the EU15, where the SYU 
was 28.8% in 1993, a record that was not even beaten in 2008 – the worst year since 1997. 
Since 2010 young people have represented a smaller part in total unemployment than one and 
a half decades before. The decreasing trend of SYU in total is even more pronounced in the 
case of Greece and Spain – these countries are well known for their high rate of total and 
youth unemployment and hence frequently used to illustrate the severity of youth 
unemployment. (Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 Share of young unemployed aged less than 25 years in total unemployment 
(SYU) 1996-2012 in the EU15, EU27, Greece and Spain, percent 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Besides, in 2012 almost all CEECs have smaller share of youth unemployment in total than in 
2008, and no CEEC has a higher rate than it had already experienced some time in the last 10-
15 years. (Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3 Share of young people aged less than 25 years in total unemployment 
(SYU) in 11 new member states of the EU (percent) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 4 shows the percentage point change of the SYU for the 27 members of the EU 
between the first years of the 2000s and 2012 by country groups (Figure 4). The SYU 
decreased first of all in the less developed member states. On the other hand in eight out of ten 
most developed member states the youngsters took a higher share in total unemployment in 
2012 than 10-12 years ago, in spite of that their share in 2012 was usually lower than in 2008. 
This follows from that in these countries the unemployment of those aged 25 and over 
increased more than those of less than 25 years of age. Consequently, in this relative sense, 
the problem of youth unemployment deteriorated first of all in the more developed member 
states in the past decade. 
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Figure 4 Change in SYU between the average of 2000-2002 and 2012 (percentage 
point) 
 
*Austria: 2000/2002-2011. **Czech Republic: 2009-2012. Blue: developed members; green: 
less developed members of EU15 i.e. euro-crisis countries (PIIGS); yellow: least developed 
members (accession in or after 2004) 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of Eurostat online database, Statistics by theme, 
various data for unemployment 
 
From the above we can conclude the following.  
1) In the past long decade in the EU27 on average the elasticity of the youth 
unemployment rate to the adult unemployment rate was less than one. This coincides 
with Higgins‟ (2010) results for the EU in the period from 2005 to 2009 (“the 
elasticity of the youth unemployment rate to the adult unemployment rate has tended 
to be less than one”. p.8) My analysis produced the same result for the OECD average 
in 1970-2011: in the overwhelming majority of these 32 years the youth 
unemployment rate increased less (in percent not in percentage point!) than the 
general unemployment rate.  
2) The SYU shows different pictures in the country groups of the EU27. The SYU has as 
a tendency been declining in the “inner periphery” (in the less developed members) of 
the Union. The trend is, however, just the opposite in the developed or “core” 
countries.  
The shrinking of young people‟s share in total unemployment (SYU, 15-24 years of age) can 
be a result of the decrease of share of youngsters (aged 15-24 years) within the population 
aged 15-74 years (labour force). For this reason I examined the relation of these two shares by 
computing a ratio that I call relative youth unemployment (RYU):  
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𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑕 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑅𝑌𝑈 =
𝑆𝑌𝑈
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑕 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
 
On aggregate level the relative size of the 15-24 age cohort in population force has been 
continuously down since 2000 in the EU27. On the other hand the SYU changed cyclically: 
increased during years of recovery built on the credit boom before the crisis and fell after 
2008. The RYU has changed accordingly: increased before the crisis and then declined. In 
2012 the RYU of the EU27 was lower than in any other years of the last more than a decade. 
(Figure 5) 
 
Figure 5 Relative youth unemployment (RYU) in the EU27 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
 
This relative irrelevance of the cohort sizes coincides with the results of Korenman and 
Neumark (2000) who examined data for 15 OECD countries in the period 1970-1994 and 
found that relative youth cohort sizes cannot explain changes in youth unemployment 
sufficiently: “Youth unemployment rates are much more responsive to general labour market 
improvements than to declines in cohort size”. (p. 97)  
The EU-average of the RYU hides differences. In 2012 the RYU was lower or the same in the 
majority of the 18 less developed countries of the EU28 (five euro-crisis countries, 11 
CEECs, Malta and Cyprus) than in the last years of the 1990s and/or in the first years of the 
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2000s
8
. This is true only for two to three countries
9
 out of the 10 more developed member 
states. In other words, in spite of the decrease after 2008, in 2012 the RYU was higher in the 
majority of the developed member states than at the end of the 1990s and/or the beginning of 
the 2000s. This result reinforces my earlier conclusion, namely, that the relative importance of 
youth unemployment increased first of all in the developed EU-members since the end of the 
1990s.  
Youth migration from the lower to the higher income countries may be a possible explanation 
for this phenomenon. The Spanish case, however, contradicts this hypothesis. Although 
immigration has been characteristic to Spain in the 2000s, the Spanish RYU has decreased 
between 1998 and 2012 almost continuously from 2.3 to 1.4. A more possible explanation is 
the growing participation of youth in third level education in the “inner periphery” of the 
Union. All in all a farther investigation is needed to explain the different paths of the RYU in 
different country groups of the EU.  
The special attention that youth unemployment gained in the past few years is not 
satisfactorily justified on the ground of the above data, since the unemployment of adults is a 
more serious issue than that of the youth. But this is not the end of the investigation of the 
problem of youth joblessness.  
Until now I examined the “active” unemployment (ILO definition). Joblessness, however, is 
not the same. The number of “discouraged” or “disengaged” people who are not on the labour 
market is on the rise and among them youngsters seem to be overrepresented. In the next 
chapter I will detail this problem. 
 
4.3 The genesis and challenge of NEETs 
The crisis put unemployment into the limelight. However, as we see from the above, the crisis 
aggravated and rendered acute the already existing problems of the European labour market, 
but did not generate them. This is true for the unemployment in general and for its special 
characteristics too. For example, the problem of NEETs has already appeared long before the 
crisis although not in continental Europe. As we mentioned earlier, the phenomenon has 
already been discovered in the UK in the 1980s, but as a crucial problem, that affects several 
countries, was identified in Latin-America as “ni-ni” („ni estudia ni trabaja‟– neither studying 
nor working) generation in the 1990s. At the end of that decade, in Latin-America more than 
20% of the youth was outside school and without a job according to the ILO (Diez de Medina 
2001, p.48). Almost half of them did not even seek a job, i.e. belonged to the “ni estudian, ni 
trabajan, ni buscan trabajo” (“neither studying, nor working, nor wanting to work”) group, or 
to the NEET (Filgueira and Fuentes, 2001, p.19). 
In the crisis hit-Europe, the phenomenon first became apparent as a Spanish, then as a Greek 
“peculiarity”, but as the unemployment in the EU was on the rise and proved to be persistent, 
the attention turned to the issue of youth unemployment in general. Especially because the 
first fire-fighting measures of the governments aimed to maintain employment. Less attention 
was devoted to job creation that is of utmost importance for the new entrances of the labour 
market, among them first of all youngsters. Thus the youth employment rate decreased much 
                                                 
8
 I compared the national RYU in 2012 with the average rates of the 1998-1999 and 2000-2002 periods. In the 
case of Austria data are not available until 2011. In the cease of the Check Republic data are available between 
2009 and 2012. In the case of Estonia and Cyprus data are not available before 2000. In the case of Croatia data 
are available since 2002. 
9
 Netherland, Belgium and to a lesser extent, Luxemburg. 
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faster than that of the other age groups. Between 2008 and 2012, youth employment rate 
dropped from 37.3% to 32.9%. In the same period, employment of those between 25 to 54 
years of age decreased only from 79.5% to 77.2% while employment rate of the 55-64 years 
age group increased.  
An additional problem that – similarly to all the other problems of the labour market – is not 
new but made the situation even worse is the insufficient rate of participation in education of 
the 15-24 years of age group. This rate grew fast until 2005. In 2006 it suddenly started 
decreasing and the following growth-path was much slower and reached the level of 2005 
(60.2%) in 2009 only
10
.  
But, probably, all these numbers would not be sufficient to get the attention of politicians in 
the absence of mass youth protests against the austerity measures (among them the increase of 
the tuition fees).  
Unlike the (active) youth unemployment, in the less developed member states the NEETs-
problem is more severe than in the more developed member states. The 10 most developed 
member states
11
 have a diminishing share in the total number of NEETs in the Union with 
35.3% in 2011.
12
 
As far as the longer term trends of NEETs are concerned, Eurostat provides data back to 
2000. Figure 6 shows that in 2012 the rate of NEETs was about the same in the 20-34 age 
cohort and smaller in the 15-19 age cohort as at the beginning of the 2000s. The boom in the 
middle of the 2000s fed by the financial bubble decreased the rate – as it decreased the rate of 
unemployment in general – but the crisis re-established the previous conditions.  
  
                                                 
10
 Eurostat statistics by theme, Participation rates in education by age and sex. 
11
 Benelux, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, UK. 
12
 Own calculation from data in Eurofound (2012) pp 76 and 79. 
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Figure 6 Rate of NEETs 2000-2012, percent 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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(active) unemployment that means a threat to the European labour market and to the European 
society in general. The threat to the society stems from the following. 
First, it is well known that young people are easier to dismiss because of the temporary and 
other less safe or “precarious” forms of their employment and they, as new entrants, find job 
on a shrinking labour market with more difficulty. This makes them feel they have no 
perspectives and have nothing to lose. Second, due to decreasing jobs and changing 
technologies, employment increasingly depends upon skills and knowledge that correspond to 
the specific and immediate needs of companies. This means that new entrants have to 
surrender their life – their personal wishes, dreams, talent etc. – increasingly to the needs of 
the “labour market”, or, more directly speaking, to the “profitability” of firms. If they want to 
subsist, they have to earn money in deteriorating social circumstances as the welfare state has 
gradually been dismantled since the 1980s. The price of their subsistence is giving up their 
ideals in a wider sense. They have to be wage-earners as the “market” i.e. profitability 
requires, instead of having the possibility to live and work as they would like to. What is 
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realization. This makes youth disappointed and angry and inspires them to turn away from or 
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usually no children, property or social position to fear for. As a consequence, they give way to 
their dissatisfaction and anger more easily. They are among the first who are ready to protest, 
fight, occupy, insist upon their demands or pursue a more “dangerous” life.  
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e.g. Afatsawo, 2011, Huffington, 2011, Karimi and Sterling, 2011, Sassen, 2011). Young 
people are not identical with the unsatisfied protesting mass at all, but they are the engine of 
the protests, as they were in 1968. They are going to play a more significant role in 
articulating the indignation of the unemployed and underpaid or indebted population, 
especially in countries where austerity measures seem to be never ending and/or the 
institutions and culture of democratic interest-representation are not developed enough. This 
is the case not only in countries like Greece or Spain, but also in the CEECs where the 
mobilization ability of traditional trade unions and grassroots civil organizations is rather 
weak.  
For 2011, Eurofound presented maps that show the density and activity of NEETs by 
countries (Mascherini 2012). The proportion of NEETs is very high in Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Ireland and high in United Kingdom and Latvia. The political and social 
engagement of the NEETs is highest in the most crisis-hit Eurozone members, namely 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. 
 
4.4 The labour market in general – NEETs are all around 
It has to be stressed that the underlying reason behind the disengagement and exclusion from 
the society of an increasing part of young people is the generally high unemployment. There 
have never been so many people without a job in Europe as there are today. Since 2009, in the 
EU15 the level of unemployment is higher than it was at its peak after the WWII. Then, in 
1994, it was 17.7 million or 10.5%. In the EU15 the unemployment reached 20.6 million 
(10.6%) in 2012 and 22.3 million (11.5%) in March 2013.
13
  
As for the EU27, the figures far outstrip the worst year (2004) since 2000 for which data are 
available. In 2012, there were 25.3 million unemployed, by 4.1 million more than in 2004. In 
2012, the rate of unemployment in the EU27 reached 10.5% whereas it stood at 9.3% in 
2004.
14
 
And here we can deepen the analysis of the problem by investigating the rate of NEETs in the 
older generation. Eurostat does not give data for that, so I made calculations on the basis of 
other Eurostat data to estimate the NEET-rate of the adult population
15
. The results are 
summarized in Table 1.  
  
                                                 
13
 Eurostat. Statistics by theme. Unemployment by sex and age groups – annual and monthly average, 1,000 
persons and unemployment rate, seasonally not adjusted data. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Methodology: I used the numbers of inactive people by age group and the rate of those inactive who are in 
education or training in the age group of 25-64. I counted those who are unemployed, their participation rate in 
formal or informal education by age-cohorts. The participation rates in education are given by the Eurostat for 
2007 and 2011 only, so I could count the rate of NEETs for the adults in these two years. From the number of 
inactive people I subtracted the old age pensioners. Other pensioners and disabled can be in the younger NEET-
generations too. The number of old age pensioners in 2011 is not given by Eurostat „Social protection/Pensions 
beneficiaries” statistics, so I estimated it by extrapolating the data for 2006-2010. I assumed that all people over 
64 years of age are old age pensioners and that all old age pensioners are older than 54 years. This influences the 
rate of NEETs in the 35-54 and 55-64 age cohorts but does not change the rate of 35-64 year-old NEETs. The 
rates of NEETs are given by the Eurostat for the 15-34 year-old population by 5-years age groups.  
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Table 1 Rate of NEETs by age groups, percent 
 2007 2011 
Eurostat data   
From 15 to 19 years 6.1 6.6 
From 15 to 24 years 10.7 12.5 
From 20 to 24 years 15.0 17.8 
From 20 to 34 years 16.6 19.0 
From 25 to 29 years 17.2 19.6 
From 30 to 34 years 17.6 19.6 
Own estimation   
From 35 to 64 years 18.1 17.6 
From 35 to 54 years 16.3 15.8 
From 55 to 64 years 22.6 21.9 
Source: For age cohorts between 15 and 34 years: Eurostat; for age cohorts between 35 and 
64 years: own calculations using Eurostat data  
 
From the data we can conclude the following: 
- Between 2007 and 2011 the rate of NEETs increased among young people and 
decreased in the adult population. 
- Apart from the 15-19-year-age group the majority of whom are in compulsory 
education, the rate of NEETs is lowest in the 35-54-year-old age cohort and the 
highest in the 55-64-year-age group.  
- Among the younger cohorts those aged from 25 to 34 years have the highest NEETs 
rate. This is the life-period when youngsters should start a family. The Youth 
Guarantee Scheme of the European Commission aims the 15-24-year age cohort only.  
- The most important conclusion is, however, that there are numerous NEETs in the 
adult population too and there is not such a big difference among age groups regarding 
NEETs rates as regarding unemployment rates. Whereas youth unemployment rate is 
more than twice as high as adult unemployment rate, there is only a few percentage 
points difference in the NEETs rates (except for the 15-19 age cohort again, where the 
rate of NEETs is the lowest because of education). On the ground of the above data, 
there were 37 to 39 million NEETs in the 35-64 years of age cohort and their number 
was cca. 23 million in the most active cohort aged 35-54. This means 57-59 million 
NEETs between 15 and 64 years of age. Taking the above into consideration, the 
problem of young NEETs seems to be exaggerated and/or the problem of adult NEETs 
seems to be neglected. Concentrating on the problem of young NEETs reflects a 
particular view. 
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Farther calculations are needed to detect the long run tendencies of adult NEETs rates on the 
one hand and the differences of youth and adult NEETs rates in member states on the other.  
Adult NEETs rates in less developed countries are likely to be higher than those of more 
developed countries. The primary reason for that can be the more extended informal economy 
in less developed countries, but this fact is to be taken into account also in connection with the 
rate of young NEETs. Still, we have to underline that on aggregate level in the EU the 
“disengagement” of the adult population is no meaningfully less than that of the young 
population.  
Taking into consideration the generally high level of NEETs and unemployment we think that 
in spite of the higher vulnerability of young generations, that justifies to a certain extent the 
special attention what they gained, the core problem is neither youth unemployment nor the 
young NEETs in themselves. It is the total joblessness that makes increasing youth 
disengagement basically unsustainable. Thus the problem of youth unemployment and young 
NEETs is only the tip of the iceberg and cannot be solved without curing the general problem 
of unemployment and adult NEETs.  
 
5 Seeking a policy solution and cooperation with civil society: Youth Guarantee 
Scheme and Unconditional Basic Income  
 
The Youth Guarantee Scheme of the EU aims at ensuring that young people under the age of 
25 are either in job or in education within four months after having left the school or their last 
job. To this purpose the Commission devotes EUR 8 billion in addition to the already existing 
EU funds between 2014 and 2020. The scheme is to be introduced by each member state in 
2014. 
The idea is not new in Europe as there have been similar systems for example in Finland 
(what was a kind of “pattern” for the initiative of the Commission) and also Austria, France, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark. Hungary launched its “First Job Guarantee” program in 
August 2012. In Austria, the “Training Guarantee” program was introduced in 2008 (EC, 
2012a, p.14-15). 
There are at least three basic problems with the YGS.  
First, the YGS does not help NEETs between 25 and 34 years of age, the rate of whom is the 
highest among younger population. Besides, neither the YGS nor other initiatives of the 
European Commission or the national governments are suitable to solve the long-term 
problem of increasing joblessness in general. 
Second, the question is, what kind of education, training, job and, first of all, what perspective 
young people will get from the YGS or similar programs. For example, the present Hungarian 
legislation concerning vocational training is in line with the YGS inasmuch as it supports 
vocational education in secondary schools. The crux is, however, that in the same time the 
government lowered compulsory school attendance age from 18 to 16 years. This measure 
testifies the nowadays prevailing view that the goal of the education system is or should have 
to be to create new labour force as quickly as possible for the “business” i.e. to earn profit. In 
vocational education little or no general knowledge is taught as there is obviously no need for 
that in most segments of production where “skilled” young people are to be employed. The 
obvious priority is the employability of the youth. Furthermore, the well known demand of 
“the industry” for quick and “practice oriented” education contradicts the other slogan that is 
frequently voiced by political and scientific circles, namely that Europe has to become a 
18 
 
“knowledge-based society”. To sum it up a “whatsoever” type of education and training 
cannot satisfactorily decrease the number of NEETs on the long run. 
The third problem is financing. The YGS offers 8 billion Euros for 7 years, which means 1.14 
billion Euros per year for regions with levels of youth (less than 25 years of age) 
unemployment higher than 25%. If we presume that only half of the 7.5 million NEETs under 
25 years live in such regions we conclude that YGS offers around 2,100 Euros per head of 
NEETs.  
According to the evaluation of 28 Swedish projects implemented between 2007 and 2012, the 
potential gains from the measures helping young people (between 18 and 30) to reintegrate 
into the labour market reach 4,200 Euros in the first year and 51,870 Euros per participant 
over five years. For this, however, Swedish authorities together with the European Social 
Fund have spent 7,810 Euros per participant of the projects on average (EC 2012b p.13). 
According to the ILO the full integration of the younger NEETs is even more expensive. In 
2010 the cost of the Swedish job guarantee program for those between 18 and 24 years of age 
was close to 6,000 Euros per participant. As a result, 46% of the participants had „successful 
outcomes”. (ILO 2012 p.46) This means, that around 12,000 Euros were needed to help one 
NEET back to the labour market or education.  
So, even if we take into consideration the differences of price levels of the member states and 
count with half of the Swedish costs only, the member states have to double the YGS from the 
national budgets in order to give effective help for only half of the 7.5 million 15-24-year-old 
European NEETs. According to the ILO (2012, p.48) implementing a young guarantee 
programme would cost about 21 billion Euros in the Euro zone only. There are however no 
additional resources, particularly in those countries where the problem is the most severe and 
tackling the high level of general unemployment demands also extra efforts from them.  
There is another initiative that reflects a more complex approach. It stems from the European 
civil society and aims at changing the position of wage labour in Europe, solving the problem 
of unemployment for good and all while liberating the proactive spirits of the society. The 
idea is the unconditional basic income (UBI) that is neither new nor unknown in the world, 
but is currently applied by some rich oil countries only. The concept originated from Thomas 
Pain in the 18
th
 century, fed the development of the welfare state until the 1980s and has been 
updated to the present European circumstances in the last decade (Van Parijs 2004). The 
concept has been debated for long (see e.g. White 1997, Van Parijs 1997,Van Der Veen 1998, 
Tod 2008, Goedemé and Van Lancker 2009). The essence of the idea is that every person, 
irrespective of age, position, profession etc. would be entitled to receive an amount that 
provides for a decent standard of living. (ECI 2013a and 2013b, Häni and Schmidt 2013, 
Wortstall 2013). The protagonists argue that in such circumstances where people are liberated 
from the pressure of wage labour the productivity of the society would enhance. The initiative 
contains a tax-reform element too. The unconditional basic income was registered as 
European Citizens‟ Initiative in January 2013 (EC 2013). The remit of the UBI is that, unlike 
the YGS, it treats the problem of the European society in its complexity, tackles the root of 
the problem and offers a similarly complex solution. 
The UBI seems to be even more problematic than the YGS from the viewpoint of financing, 
elaborating the institutions and changing the society‟s general way of thinking. But Europe‟s 
problems, namely the growing joblessness, poverty, income differences, dissatisfaction with 
the European Union and the welfare state in general are complex issues themselves. So the 
possible solution will not be simple, low cost and rapid either.  
 
19 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The problem of youth unemployment has been present in Europe for decades. Although the 
crisis hit youngsters badly, the unemployment of older people grew more. The share of 
youngsters within total unemployment is smaller now than it was ten years ago in the majority 
of the less developed countries of the EU. This cannot be explained by the decreasing trend of 
the proportion of the youth in the total population, as the trend of RYU testifies. On the other 
hand, in the majority of the most developed member states the weight of youth unemployment 
in total tends to be higher and has increased more than in the less developed members since 
the beginning of the 2000s.  
It is the NEET-phenomenon instead of conventional youth (active) unemployment that means 
a great threat to the European labour market and to the European society in general. But what 
is more important: the long-term problem of youth employment and the increasing rate and 
number of young NEETs are only the consequences of the tendencially increasing total 
unemployment, the high rate of NEETs of the adults and the increasing polarization of the 
society. For these problems the EU and its Youth Guarantee Scheme does not offer an 
adequate solution.  
The engine of our market economy nowadays is the imperative to be competitive, and 
sufficiently profitable on the market. The profit motive looks for cheaper unit labour costs, 
and thus causes a historically and tendencially increasing unemployment that inevitably leads 
to the rise of workless and disappointed generations. This tendency can be broken by ensuring 
a safe existence and participation in the society for all its members. Instead of or at least along 
with the particular and old methods of curing the immediate problems only a fundamentally 
changed and complex view of the labour market can help. The Unconditional Basic Income 
initiative of the European civil society is exemplary. In the absence of such an approach, 
particular policies, programs and schemes be these ever well elaborated and financed can only 
offer temporary success at best. 
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